

IPS Doc. No. 1157A

Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_\_

Copy of telegram. General No. 4991  
4994

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Received

To: Ambassador OSHIMA in Berlin.

From: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

Re: Japan's mediation in the Thailand-French Indo-China border dispute.

#123 (Foreign Office, Secret)

Concerning the current mediation in the Thailand-French Indo-China border dispute, please propose to the government to which you are assigned to use its good offices to have Vichy government accept our mediation plan after having explained the following:

(1) The success or failure of our mediation will not only gravely affect the political situation of East Asia, but the positions of all Axis Powers. Hence, this is not merely a local problem between Thailand and French Indo-China. That is, in case of rupture of the mediation, fighting between Thailand and French Indo-China will inevitably start again and this, in the long run, may lead to our armed intervention. However, in such case, it will become impossible to obtain rubber, rice and other products of that area, which are of necessity to both Japan and Germany. Needless to say, this not only will be a great obstacle in the execution of the national policies of both Japan and Germany, but will enable England and America to take advantage of this opportunity to throw the South Seas into confusion through intensification of their activities toward the Netherland East Indies and French Indo-China and also through the carrying out of their favorite propaganda. It is clearer than seeing fire that this will upset Japan's southern policy and eventually cause a serious set-back in the operations of Germany and Italy.

Moreover, in the above instance, the situation will be such that it will be difficult to guarantee that England will not steal a march on us and take such action as to occupy the strategic points of Thailand. (For example, KORA Isthmus.) On the other hand, in case the mediation is a success, we will be able to peacefully establish our influence in Thailand and French Indo-China and also firmly establish the grounds upon which to request for the various conveniences which we desire, besides leaving no room for the activities of England and America. Therefore, the question as to whether the position of Japan in East Asia will be strengthened or not depends directly on the success of this mediation and this, at the same time,

affects the question of the extension of the Axis powers' influence against England and America.

(2) However, there is too great a gap in the assertions of both France and Thailand and there appears to be no sign of their compromising readily. On the other hand, since the international situation has become such that further delay in the settlement of the matter is not permissible, we have taken the assertions of both into consideration and decided this mediation plan. However, the gist of it is to return to Thailand the greater part of the territory lost in 1904 and 1907. The former was taken from Thailand by France as compensation for the abolition of extraterritoriality, but if the illogical state wherein extraterritoriality, itself, was established by force is taken into consideration, it was all the more illogical to make her cede her territory as compensation and this should be corrected. The latter was taken over from Thailand in the form of an exchange for several small areas, but looking at it racially or historically, there is no basis for it. It is merely a case where France stole it with the pressure of a powerful state.

Moreover, in our mediation plan, we have decided to return only a small portion of the latter to Thailand in the form of a sale and to reserve for French Indo-China the historic sites of Cambodia in recognition of French Indo-China's cultural achievements towards Angkor Wat.

(3) Reasons for deciding on the mediation plan.

(a) Besides that mentioned previously, the question of restoration of lost territory is, for France, a problem of a colony or, accurately speaking, an area of a protectorate located far away and having no natural connection when considered from all racial, historical, geographical and cultural aspects, but it is, for Thailand, a problem of her domain and racial alienation. Hence, the degree of gravity differs completely.

(b) Although France points out that Thailand has suddenly enlarged upon her demand (the two areas of Laos on the right bank of the Mekong River) made prior to the acceptance of Japan's mediation and asserts that this is unreasonable, that there may be such a change with the development of military action is inevitable. Hence, the question lies in whether the present Thailand-French Indo-China border is correct when the truth is considered.

(c) In regard to the war situation, although Thailand was defeated in sea battles, it has been an overwhelming victory for Thailand in regard to land battles, which hold the key to overall victory, and if we had not proposed to mediate, the Thailand army would have overrun all Cambodia. Besides the above fact, it is not only our officers, who have inspected the locality who unanimously admits the fact that the morale of the Thailand army is high while

the French Indo-China army has absolutely no fighting spirit, but even among the French officials who have visited the front, there are some expressing the same opinion.

(d) In view of this above-mentioned fact and from the fact that the French Indo-China army although she may re-open hostilities is unable to oppose the Thailand army with all its force while the Japanese army is stationed north of Hanoi as at present, the defeat of the French is nearly certain. Consequently, it would be wise for France to forget all sentimental arguments and sour grapes at this time and seek for a rapid solution of the problem with the magnanimity worthy of a great nation rather than to discuss peace after being defeated.

(e) In regard to the territory lost in 1904, although it seems as if France has a true intention toward restitution on the whole, she is manifesting considerable disapprobation in regard to the territory lost /T.N. by Thailand/ in 1907. As for Thailand, however, there is a view that the former could have been acquired without depending on our mediation and that if Japan had not intervened, they would have been able to take back more territory in the Cambodia area. The British also are supporting this view to dampen Japan's mediation and since this will lead to the alienation of the collaboration between Japan and Thailand, the possibility of Thailand regarding our mediation as troublesome from that standpoint of her international /T.N. This has been changed to "internal" but the original Japanese character is not crossed out/ situation and resorting to arms again is great if the restoration of lost territories is restricted to the former. Hence, we are confronted with the absolute necessity of making the French make some concession in regard to the latter and of preventing Thailand from ceding from our camp and joining the Anglo-American camp.

(4) According to the explanation of Thailand, when Thailand sought for Germany's help in regard to this question of restoration of lost territories, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had replied to the Thailand Minister in Germany and to the Thailand Foreign Minister through the German Minister in Thailand that since problems of French Indo-China have been all left in the hands of Japan, Japan should be consulted, and Thailand is thinking of acting according to Japan's view in regard to this matter.

However, there has been no manifestation of such intention as mentioned above from Germany at any time. Not only that, but France has hinted that as a result of the German-French Armistice agreement, they have no right to dispose of freely problems such as this matter pertaining to the disposition of her colonies until the peace conference. Hence, it is deemed that the difficulty for the completion of the mediation lies with France.

However,

(1) Since the success of the mediation will greatly affect the execution of the national policies of the Axis powers, it is necessary to bring this immediately to a success by all means and to establish our influence and stamp out the activities of England and America.

(2) If we do not satisfy Thailand to a certain extent, there is the danger of Thailand swinging away from Japan. Moreover, for this purpose, it is necessary to add pressure on France, but to make France accept our mediation plan, it is deemed that there is no alternative but to rely upon the speedy and effective good offices of the German Government toward the Vichy Government. Hence, it is desired that appropriate measures be devised immediately.

Furthermore, the chief of the Bureau of South Seas Affairs has shown our mediation plan to the German councillor here on the 17th and has requested for the good offices of the German Government after explaining the detailed situation.

Message relayed to France and Italy.

Ac. 1157-1

電信寫 總國九九一 符 昭和十一年二月十七日午後十時廿分發主  
號四九九四 號 昭和 年 月 日 時 分 差 管

在獨大島大使宛松岡外務大臣發

「タイ」佛印國境紛争調停ニ關スル件

第一二三號（外機密）

今次ノ「タイ」佛印國境紛争調停ニ關シ貴使ハ左記  
責任國政府ニ御説明ノ上「ヴァイシー」政府ノ我方調  
停案受諾方ニ付至急貴方申入相成度

(一) 調停ノ成否ハ東亞方面ノ政治狀態ノミナラス南  
國全體ノ地位ニ重大ナル影響ヲ及ボスモノニシテ  
早ナル「タイ」佛印間ノ局地的問題ニ非ス即チ調  
停不調ノ場合ハ必然的ニ「タイ」佛印間戦闘再開  
セラレ奉イテ我方ノ實力的干渉ヲ誘致スルコトト  
モナルヘキ處其ノ場合ニハ日獨兩國ノ必要トスル  
「ゴム」米ヲ給メ同地方ノ物産ヲ入手スル能ハサ  
ルニ至リ日獨兩國カ其ノ國策遂行上一大支障ヲ蒙  
ルハ勿論矣米仙ハ之ヲ機會ニ南印及佛印等ニ對ス  
ル策動ヲ強メ得意ノ宣稱ヲ併セ行ヒテ南洋ヲ混亂  
ニ陥レ以テ日本ノ前方政策ヲ阻害セシメ奉イテ獨  
逸ノ作戦ニ一大阻害ヲ生セシメントスルハ火ヲミ  
ルヨリモ助ナリ更ニ右ノ場合英國ハ我方ノ機先ヲ  
制シテ「タイ」ノ軍事的要衝ヘ向ヘハ「イラー」地



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(三) 然ルニ第一「タイ」一方主張ハ餘リニモ大ナル懸隔アリテ容易ニ妥協ノ望ナク、一方國情勢ハ在昔本件ノ解決ヲ遲延スルヲ許ササルニ至シテ以テ我方ハ孤方ノ主張ヲ汲ミテ斷然決意セル處其ノ管子ハ一九〇四年ノ失地及一九〇七年ノ失地ノ大部分ヲ「タイ」ニ返還セシムルニ在リ、前者ハ其ノ代價トシテ土地ヲ保護セシメタル如キハ倫理不合理ニシテ是非共是正ノ要アリ、後者ハ若干ノ小地域ト交換ノ形式ニヨリ「タイ」ヨリ譲リ受ケタルモノナルカ右ハ民族的ニ見ルモ際中のニ見ルモ何等根據アルモノニ非ス雖ニ尙國カ西國ノ懸

峽(占領ノ如キ邊ニ出テ來ラストモ採シ難キ情勢ニ在リ之ニ反シ「タイ」成功ノ場合ハ平穩ニ「タイ」及「印」ニ我方勢力ヲ樹立シ我方ノ欲スル各條ノ便宜ヲ要求スル要求ヲ立セララルト共ニ英米ノ贊助ヲ得地ナカラシムヘシ漸クテ「印」ノ取否ハ直ニ東亞ニ於ケル日本ノ地位カ強化セララルヤ否ヤノ問題ニシテ右ハ同時ニ「英米」ニ對スル勢力増張ノ問題ト關涉ス

Doc/15779

力ニ依リ強坂シタルモノニ過キス然モ我方調停案  
ニ於テハ後者ハ賢智ノ形式ニ依リ若干部分ノミ  
タイニ返還セシムルト共ニ「カムボヂヤ」ノ舊  
跡「アジコール・ワット」ニ對スル佛印ノ文化的  
功跡ヲ移入之ヲ停ニ佛印ニ留保セシムル事ナリ  
ラレリ

### (三) 調停案決定理由

(イ) 前記ノ外本件失地回復問題ハ佛側ニトリテハ民  
族的・歴史的・地理的・文化的ノ凡ユル方面ヨリ  
見テ自然的に素チき遼闊ノ地ニ於ケル一國民地  
正統ニ云ベク一保護區ノ地境ノ同地ナルカ「タ  
イ」國ニトリテハ母國領域及民族保護ノ問題タ  
リ兵ノ配置ノ反逆ク莫ナリ

(ロ) 佛側ハ「タイ」ガ日本ノ調停受託前通ノ要求  
「メーコン」河右岸ノ「ラオス」ノ二地方「ラ  
俄」カニ増大セルヲ指擧シ右ヲ不當ナリト主張ス  
ルモ所ノ如キ變化ハ軍事行動ノ進展ニ隨伴スル  
コトアルヘキハ已ムヲ待サル處ニシテ問題ハ現  
在ノ「タイ」佛印國境ガ正理ニ照シテ正ナルヤ  
否ヤニ在リ

(ハ) 戦況ハ佛側ニ於テハ「タイ」側カ慘敗ヲ喫シタ  
ルモ全般的勝敗ノ況ヲ論ルルハ「タイ」  
側ノ壓倒的勝利ニシテ我方ノ調停申告ナクハ「

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タイ「軍ハ全」カムボジヤ「ヲ席捲シタルナル  
ヘク現地ヲ觀察セル我方將校ハ兵口同音ニ右事  
實ノ外「タイ」軍ノ志氣旺盛ナルニ反シ佛印軍  
ニ全然同志ナキ事實ヲ認メラルノミナラス以線  
ヲ觀察セル佛國要人中ニモ同意見ヲ洩シ居ル者  
モアル位ナリ

(ニ右事實ニ鑑ミ且ハ又戰鬪再開スルモ日本軍カ河  
内以北ニ駐屯シアル現在佛印軍ハ全勢力ヲ擧ゲ  
テ「タイ」軍ニ對抗スル能ハサルノ關係ヨリ見  
テ佛側ノ敗感ハ略確實ナルヘク從而佛側トシテ  
モ敗シテ後和ヲ談スルヨリモ此際一切ノ感情論  
ヲ賃惜ミヲ捨テ大國の標度ヲ以テ急速ニ問題解  
決ヲ計ル方却而賢明ナルヘシ

(ホ佛側ヲ於テハ一九〇四年失地ニ付テハ大体還付  
ノ底意アルヤニ見ユルモ一九〇七年ノ失地ニ至  
リテハ頗ル難色ヲ示シアル處「タイ」側ニ於テ  
ハ兩者ハ我方ノ調停ヲ俟タストモ獲得シ得タル  
所ニシテ日本ノ調停ナクシハ夏ニ「カムボジヤ」  
方面ニ於テ領土回復ヲ實現シ得タルナルヘシト  
ノ論アリ英國亦此議論ノ後押シヲナシ日本ノ調  
停ニ格々附ケ日「タイ」提揚疏隔ニ六章トナ  
リタルヲ以テ若シ失地ハ回復カ固著ニ限ララル  
カ如キコトアラハ「タイ」ハ固内情勢上我

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方ノ調停ヲ迷惑トシ再ビ干戈ニ訴フルノ可能性  
多シ依而我方トシテハ後者ニ付テモ佛側ヲシテ  
若干讓歩セシメ以テ「タイ」ガ我方陣營ヲ離レ  
テ英米陣營ニ走ルヲ防グノ絶對的必要ニ直面シ  
居レリ

(四)「タイ」側説明ニ依レバ「タイ」ハ失地回復問題  
ニ關シ獨逸ノ援助ヲ求メタル處佛印問題ハ全  
部日本ニ一任シアルヲ以テ日本ニ相談セラレタキ  
旨「リ」外相ヨリ駐獨「タイ」公使ニ又駐「タイ」  
獨逸公使ヨリ「タイ」國外相ニ回答アリタル邊ニ  
テ「タイ」ハ本件ハ一ニ我方ノ意圖次第ナリト考  
ヘ居ル實情ナリ然ルニ我方ニ對シテハ嘗テ獨逸ヨ  
リ右様ノ意志表示ナキノミナラズ佛側ハ獨逸休戰  
條約ノ結果本件ノ如キ祖氏地處分ニ關スル問題ハ  
平和會議迄自由處分權ナキ旨仄カシ居リ調停成立  
ノ難關ハ佛側ニ在リト認メラル然ルニ

(イ)調停ノ成否ハ樞軸國ノ國策遂行ニ多大ノ關係ア  
リ是非共之ヲ至急成切セシメ我方勢力ヲ確立シ  
テ英米ノ策動ヲ根絶スルノ要アリ

(ロ)「タイ」側ヲ或程度満足セシメザレバ「タイ」  
ハ日本ヨリ離レ去ル虞アリ然モ之ガ爲ニハ佛ニ  
壓力ヲ加フルノ要アル處佛ヲシテ我調停案ヲ受  
諾セシムル爲ニハ獨逸政府ノ「ヴンハイム」政府

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ニ對スル迅速有效ナル斡旋ニ俟ツノ外ナシト思  
考セラルルニ付大至急適當ノ措置ヲ講セラレタ  
シ  
尙當地ニ於テモ十七日南洋局長ヨリ獨逸參事官  
ニ對シ我方調停案ヲ示シ詳細ノ事情説明ノ上獨  
逸政府ノ斡旋方申入置ケリ  
佛伊へ轉電セリ